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1. Introduction
The scientific method is used to determine objective truths of the natural world,
and is effective at arriving at such 'objective' truths provided that its subject
matter is suitable to this method of inquiry. Unfortunately, with the scientific
method comes the attitude of scientism which tells us to reject any notion of
truth that cannot be arrived at 'objectively'. Problems occur, however, when we
try to apply our scientific standards of truth to our 'life world', and these
problems are most evident in the human sciences.
Hans Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur are concerned with such problems
and have argued in their writings that a hermeneutical theory is an alternative to
a scientific inquiry when humanity itself is the subject. Instead of an 'objectively'
derived truth that corresponds to reality, hermeneutical inquiry seeks to
understand and interpret our world. It is this rejection of the correspondence
theory of truth that has aligned hermeneutics with rhetoric. According to
Gadamer, in absence of demonstrable truth, the persuasion and acceptance
which rhetoric seeks is "obviously as much the aim and measure of
understanding and interpretation"(Gadamer 1977: 24). Thus hermeneutical
theory has had a long association with rhetoric since "the theoretical tools of
the art of interpretation (hermeneutics) have been to a large extent borrowed
from rhetoric"(Gadamer 1977: 24).
In light of recent developments in the study of argumentation, I think it may be
time to reevaluate the association of hermeneutics with rhetoric. Another
method of inquiry has evolved, one which may prove to be closer to the aims of
the hermeneutical project rather than rhetoric itself. The field to which I refer is
informal logic. Since there is no one standard theory of informal logic, I have
chosen the writings of Ralph Johnson, a well respected and veteran member in
the informal logic field. Using his paper, Argumentative Space: Logical and
Rhetorical Approaches, I will outline the differences between informal logic
and rhetoric, and suggest that after an analysis of these differences, informal
logic appears to be closer to hermeneutics in its overall structure and telos
than rhetoric. Before doing so, however, more needs to be said about the
connections between hermeneutics and rhetoric.
 
2.Hermeneutics and Rhetoric
As mentioned in the introduction, hermeneutical theory does not wish to
demonstrate 'truth', rather, it seeks to understand our life world. On the topic of
hermeneutical understanding, Ricoeur writes, "The first function of
understanding is to orientate us in a situation. So understanding is not
concerned with grasping a fact but with apprehending a possibility of being"
(Ricoeur 1994: 56). It is our existence within culture, language, and history that
gives us a situatedness; however, it does not follow that we are completely
determined by our situation. It is this situatedness that opens us to new
possibilities. These possibilities of being can be contained within a text, or
within a dialogue, and we must go through the process of understanding and
interpreting in order to grasp the meaning of these other modes of being.
Gadamer writes that this process involves, "working out appropriate
projections, anticipatory in nature, to be confirmed "by the things" themselves,
is the constant task of understanding"(Gadamer 1997: 267).
Part of the idea of situatedness are the concepts of 'horizon' and the 'fusion of
horizons'. On this subject Ricoeur writes, "wherever there is a situation, there is
an horizon which can be contracted or enlarged"(Ricoeur 1994: 62). Since
one's situatedness is primarily responsible for one's horizon, when we
communicate with another or with a text there is a "fusion of horizons", a
common ground between oneself and another is found, and new possible ways
of being emerge.
There exists an ethical element in this concept as well. Although I will return to
this point later in this paper, for now it will suffice to say that enlarging one's
horizon can be seen as an 'ethical move'. It is understood by Gadamer and
Ricoeur that humans seek to understand each other and their life worlds. This
understanding is achieved through an openness to the possible ways of being.
Hermeneutics tends to regard quite favourably those who are willing to enlarge
their horizon and reevaluate their respective positions.
The limits of one's horizon are determined by one's prejudices. It is important
to note, however, that Gadamer uses the word with its original intention,
literally, a prejudgement. Due to our situatedness, when we try to discern a new
possible way of being, the open stance that we must take "includes our
situating the other meaning in relation to the whole of our own meanings or
ourselves in relation to it"(Gadamer 1997: 267). In this sense, prejudice does
not have a negative connotation because without some prejudices, we would
not have the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever, as there would no way to
relate the alien to the familiar. Our openness to the text "involves neither a
neutrality with respect to content, nor the extinction of one's self, but the
foregrounding and appropriation of one's own fore meanings and prejudices"
(Gadamer 1997: 268). These foremeanings and prejudices cannot and should
not dictate the understanding one has of the text or the speaker. According to
Gadamer, "the important thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text
can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one's
own foremeanings"(Gadamer 1997: 269). Relating Gadamer's concept of
prejudice with that of a horizon, when we are engaged in the hermeneutical act
of understanding and interpreting, our prejudices provide the possibility for the
fusion of horizons, but ultimately, if a new possibility of being is to be realized,
these prejudices must accommodate the new, extended horizon. This new
horizon does not dismiss the old prejudices, as it "is continually in the process
of being formed because we are continually having to test all our prejudices"
(Gadamer 1997: 306).
When extending our horizons and reassessing our prejudices, the
understanding occurs through language, "language is the universal medium in
which understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting"(Gadamer
1997: 389), yet it is important to note that this does not entail linguistic
relativism, but rather a universalism. Gadamer writes:
Any language in which we live is infinite in this sense, and it is completely mistaken to infer
that reason is fragmented because there are various languages. Just the opposite is the case.
Precisely through our finitude, the particularity of our being, which is evident even in the
variety of language, the infinite dialogue is opened in the direction of the truth that we are
(Gadamer 1977:16).
 
Language does not 'trap' us; rather, it is the medium through which Being is
revealed. Returning to the scientific method and its claim to objective 'truth', we
can see that even science must engage in understanding and interpretation
before explanation can be attempted because it also is necessarily language
dependent.
What then happens to our all important concept of 'truth' if we do not have an
'objective' method to help us find our footing against a relativistic critique? In
chapter two of his book The Hermeneutics of PostModernity, Gary Madison
offers his interpretation of Gadamerian 'criteria' to follow when trying to
determine the truth of an interpretation. Briefly, they are as follows: coherence,
comprehensiveness, penetration, thoroughness, appropriateness,
contextuality, agreement, suggestiveness, and potential (Madison 1990: 30).
When one argues for the validity of a particular interpretation, "one adduces
reasons, i.e. one appeals to certain commonly or widely accepted principles
and maintains that interpretation 1 as opposed to interpretation 2, more
faithfully embodies such principles"(Madison 1990: 32). Thus, here lies the first
connection with rhetoric; acceptance as against truth. Instead of
demonstratively proving or logically deducing the 'truth' of a given position,
hermeneutical theory appeals to these 'criteria', and thus one is persuaded by
the truth of a particular interpretation when the interpretation embodies these
principles. This does not mean, however, that acceptance is only necessary
and sufficient for the 'truth' of a given interpretation in the sense that one
group's acceptance of an interpretation automatically renders it true. This
would imply a sort of relativism that hermeneutics wants to avoid. To answer
this charge, we must return to Madison and Gadamer. Gadamer writes:
 
And so we see that the rhetorical and hermeneutical aspects of human linguisticality
completely interpenetrate each other. There would be no speaker and no art of speaking if
understanding and consent were not in question, were not underlying elements; there would
be no hermeneutical task if there were no mutual understanding that has been disturbed and
that those involved in a conversation must search for and find again together (Gadamer 1977:
25).
This quote not only illustrates the connection between hermeneutics and
rhetoric on the basis of consent and agreement, it also underscores the
second important connection between the two on the subject of practice.
Hermeneutics and rhetoric are concerned with practice in the sense that both
intend to achieve a new understanding, or to rephrase this point using
Gadamer's terminology, a fusion of horizons. The orator wants to convince us
of her position, and the hermeneuticist offers reasons for her interpretation.
Returning to the charge of relativism as a consequence of using acceptance
as a truth criteria, according to Madison, the practice of hermeneutics
presupposes "a kind of universality, that is to say, a communality"(Madison
1990: 32). Madison's 'criteria' for determining the 'truth' of a given
interpretation are accepted by the community, and thus when we argue for a
given position or for a given interpretation, this practice "therefore, bases itself
on recognized, commonly accepted norms and seeks, through argumentation,
to a legitimate new, concrete decision"(Madison 1990: 32). So although these
principles are not demonstratively proven themselves, their acceptance by the
community at large gives us a way of legitimizing our reasoning that is neither
relativistic nor demonstratively universal.
In conclusion, rhetoric and hermeneutics intersect where one seeks an
understanding with another or with a text. Understanding and interpretation are
achieved through persuasion which naturally finds itself in the realm of the
practical instead of the theoretical. Madison writes:
It is not to science but to rhetoric or the theory of persuasive argumentation that interpretation
should look for its theoretical and methodological grounding...rhetoric has taught us that while
in the realm of human affairs and action we can never be absolutely certain of anything, we
can nevertheless have legitimate grounds for believing that some things are clearly better than
others (Madison 1990: 35).
 
3.Informal Logic and Rhetoric
In the introduction I said that the field of informal logic is by no means to be
considered a homogenous whole. In light of this fact, I have chosen what I
consider to be a good representative of informal logic as my authority on the
subject. Ralph Johnson has written extensively on the subject over a twenty
year period, and along with his co-writer J. Anthony Blair, is responsible for the
launching and continued editing of the respected and successful journal
Informal Logic. Using Johnson's article Argumentative Space: Logical and
Rhetorical Approaches, I will outline the differences between informal logic
and rhetoric, after which I turn to my main proposal.
The term 'informal logic' is sometimes regarded as a misnomer. While logic,
both ancient and modern "might be said to be that discipline which articulates
and refines the standards (and their theoretical foundation) of right or wrong in
matters of reasoning and argumentation"(Johnson 1996: 4), to call this area of
philosophy informal seems like a bon marché. There are, however, some
fundamental differences which point to the idea that while being informed by
formal deductive logic (FDL), and rhetoric even, informal logic has emerged as
a field in its own right.
For my purposes here, I cannot trace the historical background of informal
logic. Suffice to say, however, that some of the fundamental differences
between FDL and informal logic may have arisen due to a dissatisfaction with
FDL's inability "to provide standards of good reasoning that illuminate the
argumentation of ordinary discourse"(Johnson 1996: 5). Since the 1970's,
many books have been written on the subject of argumentation with the
purpose of enhancing students' reasoning skills. In addition, many universities
have implemented 'critical thinking' courses which in turn have become part of
the core curriculum for many faculties. The arguments used as examples for
study in both the courses and the texts are usually taken from newspaper
editorials, letters to the editor and other public sources of debate and
controversy. So, like rhetoric and hermeneutics, informal logic is very much
concerned with practice.
According to Johnson and Blair, informal logic can be seen as:
a branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the
analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critical and construction of argumentation in everyday
discourse (Johnson and Blair 1988: 148).
 
Although this definition serves as a good starting point that emphasises
informal logic's connection to practice, there are nuances to Johnson's theory
that must be brought to light. It is important to note, that Johnson and Blair
prefer a written model of argumentation as opposed to a spoken one. There
are many reasons for this but briefly, it can be said that the written model has
one clear advantage to the spoken one because it can be preserved and
archived for future critique, thus escaping the temporality of speech.
To help us understand the differences between informal logic and rhetoric,
Johnson uses a metaphor which he calls 'argumentative space'.
His thesis is that rhetoric and informal logic see this space differently.
Argumentative space, and to this both informal logic and rhetoric would agree,
has the following characteristics:
 
At the core of the practice is the process of arguing--a specific type of interchange between
two or more participants. In the typical interchange, there is a difference in point of view that
has crystallized around some issue (I), and one of the participants (the arguer) is attempting
to persuade the other of the truth of the thesis (T). An argument may be viewed as the
distillate of this process, the product which emerges from it, whether in writing or in speech
(Johnson 1977: 9).
To begin to see the difference, when we focus on three important aspects of an
argument: telos, structure and evaluative criteria, the differing approaches to
argumentative space between informal logic and rhetoric become clear.
Although I have listed these three separately, in actuality, they are very much
connected. The telos of an argument will determine its structure, and the
specifics of a structure will be partly determined by the evaluative criteria.
Argumentative space is purposive, i.e. we are seeking to convince another
rationally of our position. According to Johnson, both informal logic and rhetoric
see this space in different ways, thus, the first difference is in their respective
goals. The telos of informal logic is rational persuasion, while the telos of
rhetoric is effective persuasion1. This difference will become more relevant
when we examine how rhetoric and informal logic operate within argumentative
space. The first characterization of argumentative space is that it is dialectical.
All argumentation presupposes a background of controversy where the
arguers and the audience may be aware, to a certain extent, about the issues
surrounding the argument. With this, I think both informal logic and rhetoric
would agree. In this dialectical space, Johnson proposes that the structure of
an argument can be divided into two main parts, the illative core and the
dialectical tier. The illative core is the central premise and conclusion structure
of the argument and "is meant to initiate the process of converting the Other(s),
winning them over to the arguer's position"(Johnson 1997: 11). As mentioned,
this takes place in a background of controversy, so the Other(s) should not be
persuaded by this alone because to do so would be to ignore other possible
positions and valuable arguments. What is required, then, is the dialectical tier.
The dialectical tier is the area of the argument where the arguer addresses the
background of controversy and attempts to answer the real or possible
objections to his or her position. Since the goal of informal logic is rational
persuasion, "to ignore them [objections], not to mention them, or to suppress
them, these could hardly be considered the moves of someone engaged in
rational persuasion"(Johnson 1996: 107). Rhetoric too, however, makes
allowance for such a tier, and one would even expect that a rhetorically
effective argument would meet counter objections. Where exactly lies the
difference? I think that the difference can be understood clearly when we bring
together rhetoric's telos and its emphasis on the audience. Since Aristotle,
rhetoric has always been 'audience driven'. According to other philosophers,
Perelman and Olbrechts Tyteca also acknowledge the fundamental role of the
audience, "argumentation is always designed to achieve a particular effect on
those for whom it is intended"(Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Henkemans
1996: 96). When one constructs an argument, according to rhetoric, one must
always have his audience in mind. This means that the argument can be said
to be 'tailored' in order to maximize the possibility of the audience's consent.
This changes the nature of argumentative space in two ways. First, it is
possible for the rhetorician to only have the illative core in his argument. Since
the goal is effective persuasion, then it is possible to persuade an audience
through the illative core alone. Johnson writes, "if the arguer can achieve the
end--effective argument--with only what I have called the illative core, then the
interest of rhetoric will have been satisfied"(Johnson 1997: 16). It is possible
for the dialectical tier to be present in a rhetoritican's argument, but this tier is
only necessary if it is needed to persuade the audience. The second way in
which rhetoric changes the nature of argumentative space is in regard to the
dialectical tier itself. As previously mentioned, since this tier is only constructed
by the arguer to achieve effective persuasion, and since rhetoric is an
audience driven theory, then it is logical to conclude that the content of the
dialectical tier will be tailored to the audience as well. Johnson writes:
Suppose that there is an objection, let us call it 0*, which the arguer knows about and which
the arguer also has very good reason to believe his audience does not know about. We may
suppose for example the arguer is the editor of a journal that has just received a paper for
publication in which this objection is raised; and we suppose that the arguer knows that the
author of the paper is not in the audience. From the point of view of rhetoric, there is no
obligation for the arguer to deal with 0*--his argument can be perfectly effective without it
[italics mine] (Johnson 1997: 16).
In other words, due to the goal of effective persuasion of a given audience, a
rhetorician is under no obligation to meet an objection that he or she believes
the audience does not know about. (I shall return to this point later as it will
prove to be useful in supporting my major claim.) If rhetoric is under no
obligation to include and answer objections unknown by the audience, then
does the arguer under informal logic have any such obligation? The answer to
this question is yes, and there are two main reasons for this being the case.
First, recall the goal of informal logic: rational persuasion. To fully appreciate
the requirements that this goal places on the structure of an argument, Johnson
employs the phrase which he calls 'manifest rationality'. It is this concept which
fully separates informal logic from rhetoric. According to Johnson, "not only
must the practice of argumentation be rational, but it must also be understood
by the participants that this is so"(Johnson 1986: 108). It is not enough that the
argument be inwardly rational; it must outwardly appear so as well. To make
this point clear, Johnson borrows an analogy from the legal system "where we
find a similar requirement that not only must justice be done, it must be seen to
be done"(Johnson 1997: 13). It may be possible for a judge to deliver a fair,
impartial sentence on a member of her family, but to do so would be to
compromise the appearance of justice. The same can be said of rationality,
since argumentation is a social practice, then rationality must be seen to be
done, and this is where we must return to our analysis of the dialectical tier.
From the perspectives of informal logic, the arguer is obligated, according to
Johnson, to include objections of which the audience may not be aware in
order to meet the requirements of manifest rationality. So in the case of the
journal editor who comes across the serious yet unpublished objection to his
argument, the editor must consider this objection and answer it in his
dialectical tier. To ignore this particular objection or others, or to "sweep them
under the carpet...would not be in keeping with the spirit of the practice" and "it
would be an obvious violation of it. Thus, it would not only not be rational; it
would not appear rational"(Johnson 1996: 108). The second reason for this
obligation arises from a difference in style. As previously mentioned, ideally,
informal logic is a written practice, while rhetoric tends to have its roots in the
oral tradition. Since the medium of informal logic is the written word, it is
almost impossible to determine ahead of time exactly the nature of one's
audience. A text can have a universal audience in the sense of this quote from
Ricoeur, "the meaning of a text is open to anyone who can read"(Ricoeur
1994: 56). In an oral tradition, however, one seems to have more of an
awareness of the people whom one is addressing. When the informal logician
constructs the dialectical tier, then, in order to account for a wider range of
readers, she must apply one of Madison's rules of thumb- comprehensiveness.
When Johnson refers to the obligations of the arguer, although he never
explicitly states this, there seems to be an ethical element in his conception of
informal logic. When we encounter objections to our position, these objections
will either prove to be detrimental to our position in the sense that we cannot
answer them, or if we can answer them successfully, our position will be
stronger. Either way, through interaction with these objections, "one's own
'logos' (discourse/reasoning/ thinking) will be affected in some way"(Johnson
1997: 11). Hence, according to informal logic, this obligation seems to allow
for the best possible argument to present itself in the end. If we are under no
obligation to expand our own 'logos' through interaction with these objections,
then we risk the possibility of presenting our audience with an inferior 'product'
whether they are aware of it or not. Does the lack of obligation automatically
mean that rhetoric is therefore inferior to informal logic? This is a question that I
do not have time to address here, but for my purposes, it suffices to say that in
the very least, since rhetoric is not under any obligation to meet the objections
unknown to the audience, then there exists the potential for the rhetorician's
argument to be more limited than the informal logician's. I will return to this
later, yet for now I think that it is both this potential of the rhetorician's argument
to be more limiting, and the ethical element of informal logic that will help me
make my major claim. The final difference between rhetoric and informal logic
has to do with their respective evaluative criteria. For rhetoric, the premises of
an argument need only to be acceptable to the particular audience; the
audience stands in agreement. According to Johnson, however, when
assessing the premises of an argument, informal logic should appeal to both
acceptability and truth. It is important to note, however, that by 'truth', Johnson
is not arguing for a return to standards of truth similar to that of formal
deductive logic, or any sort of scientifically validated notion of truth. Although he
admits that much work needs to be done in this area, he does allow for those
who do not want to use the word 'truth' to use alternatives, i.e. "a deeper
understanding of the issue"2 or "best possible position"(Johnson 1997: 22).
To review, the differences between informal logic and rhetoric are in their
respective telos, structure and evaluative criteria. For rhetoric, the goal is
effective persuasion. The goal of informal logic is rational persuasion. Part of
the concept of rational persuasion is manifest rationality; it is not enough that
an argument be rational, it must also appear rational in order to keep with the
spirit of the practice. This manifest rationality places certain demands on the
arguer; the presence of the dialectical tier is necessary in an informal logician's
argument, in contrast, for rhetoric, this tier is only conditional. Finally, Johnson
holds that a truth requirement must be present in any sort of evaluative criteria,
whereas rhetoric only needs acceptance.4.Informal logic and Hermeneutics
Recall the major claim: in light of recent developments in argumentation theory,
informal logic may have closer ties to hermeneutical theory than rhetoric. To
begin my case, consider the final difference outlined in the previous section.
For informal logic, it is not enough for the premises of an argument to be
acceptable; they also must be true. Johnson allows for an alternative to 'truth'
as a "deeper understanding of the issue" or "the best possible position". The
question arises then, how does one achieve this? I think it would be useful to
import Gary Madison's 'criteria' as the evaluative criteria to expand upon
Johnson's truth criterion. We can therefore judge the 'truth' of an argument's
premises if the argument can be shown to embody these principles. In
contrast, rhetoric's evaluative criteria only has the requirement of acceptability.
The rhetorician's premises need not be 'true', it only needs to be 'acceptable'
to the audience so that the audience stands in agreement with respect to the
premises. My suggestion is that informal logic's 'truth' requirement can
interface easier with hermeneutic's conception of truth than rhetoric's
acceptability requirement. This is not to say that acceptability can never lead to
'truth'. One may have a sophisticated audience that will only accept what is
'true' and has passed Madison's 'criteria'. The difference, as I have said
before, is a matter of potential. In her pursuit of acceptance, the rhetorician
runs of the risk of excluding too many other positions, since her obligation lies
in the persuasion of the audience. The informal logician, however, does not
have that risk since the obligation lies with the demands of manifest rationality
instead of the demands of an audience, which may not be comprised of ideal
subjects, open to all points of view, and only willing to accept the best possible
argument3. The ethical demands of manifest rationality leads me to my next
point of intersection between informal logic and hermeneutics; the concept of
prejudice, and the "fusion of horizons".
As mentioned in a previous section, one's prejudices mainly determine one's
horizon. When attempting to understand a text or an Other, we can regard the
enlarging of a horizon as an ethical move. My suggestion is that the ethical
obligation of the informal logician promotes the expansion of another's horizon
more effectively than rhetoric, and thus has a similarity to the ethical element at
work in hermeneutics. Hermeneutics tells us that in order to achieve any
understanding whatsoever common ground must be found. Informal logic, then,
must be partly bound by the concept of prejudice in the sense that the
argument may not be so completely alien that there would not be any hope of
understanding. In other words, there must be the element of the familiar in the
argument. The issue is, however, the degree which the familiar is realized.
Recall the obligation imposed by manifest rationality on the informal logician. In
an argument, the dialectical tier must be present, and it also must include and
answer objections which may be unknown to the larger community. In order to
move from alien to the familiar, in order for one to reach a new understanding,
one's horizon and prejudices must change. In this sense, informal logic allows
for the greater expansion of a given horizon because the obligations imposed
on the dialectical tier mean that the unknown, the alien, must be included and
answered in the argument. Thus, when a person is confronted with the
argument, and if he truly wants to understand, then his horizon and prejudices
must accommodate the newly revealed possible way of being. This scenario
differs from rhetoric, since the aim of rhetoric is to gain acceptance from the
audience, and it seems reasonable that the shortest route to acceptance for
the rhetorician is to 'play' into the prejudices of an audience. These prejudices,
though they must shift the horizon in order fuse with the rhetorician's, have less
of a chance of encountering an unfamiliar way of being since the rhetorician
has no obligation to address the unknown possibility.
Of course there is nothing preventing the rhetorician from adding a dialectical
tier to his argument or constructing the tier insofar as the alien and the
unfamiliar is present; this is praiseworthy and commendable. The point is,
however, that rhetoric imposes no obligations on the arguer to do this. It may
also be that the goal of rhetoric is more easily reached when one does not
introduce the unfamiliar objections to one's position. It is reasonable to
suppose that we are more likely to assent to the familiar because the alien
imposes certain demands on our prejudices that we may not want to meet at
the time. Reevaluating one's prejudices in light of the new is not an easy task,
and hence we tend to praise those who seek to enlarge their horizons,
embrace the new, and call into question their certainties.
In conclusion, due to both the inclusion of a hermeneutical conception of 'truth'
in Johnson's evaluative criteria, and the obligations imposed on the informal
logician, it appears that hermeneutics may have more in common with informal
logic than with rhetoric. Informal logic serves the universal project of
hermeneutics better with its appeal to manifest rationality because it allows for
the larger expansion of one's horizon. This is due to the construction of the
dialectical tier which requires the arguer to answer the new possible ways of
being that may be unknown to others. If the goal is to just persuade an
audience, then this goal is achieved more easily by either the exclusion of the
dialectical tier, or its inclusion in a more limited, audience directed way.
The choice, then, for hermeneutics seems to be no longer between a formal
demonstrative method as in science, or rhetoric and its associated limitations.




1This characterizes not only Perelman's position, a widely known authority on
the subject of rhetoric, but others as well.  "We believe the paradigm case of
rhetoric is the use of the spoken word to persuade an audience."  (Foss, Foss
and Tramp 1985:  11).
2I realize that I have only touched on this area briefly and have not given it the
thorough treatment it requires.  The truth/acceptability debate is a much
contested area in the field of argumentation and for the purposes of space, I
cannot go into it here.  It suffices to say, however, that Johnson is aware of
these arguments and one of the main reasons why he wants both acceptability
and truth in the evaluative criteria is that "the notion of truth is presupposed in
much of the vocabulary we want to have available when we evaluate
arguments".  We can still talk about 'truth' without automatically aligning
ourselves with a correspondence theory.
3An amusing example of the less than ideal audience is a group of cattle
ranchers that were attending a talk given by a former professor of mine.  As an
environmentalist, she was giving reasons why beef eating is detrimental to
both human health and the earth.  It was clear to her that the audience was not
buying the argument because some were not paying any attention, and others
had began to openly heckle her.  She finally got their attention when she came
to the last health reason on her list: impotence.  It was a deft rhetorical move on
her part, but the point of the story is that there are ethical demands placed on
an audience when they move into argumentative space.  One should be open
to all reasons in an argument, not just the ones that have an immediate effect.
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